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THE SANCTIFICATION ARGUMENT 
FOR PURGATORY
David Vander Laan
A recently advanced argument for purgatory hinges on the need for complete 
sanctification before one can enter heaven. The argument has a modal gap. 
The gap can be exploited to fashion a competing account of how sanctifica­
tion occurs in the afterlife according to which it is in part a heavenly process. 
The competing account usefully complicates the overall case for purgatory 
and raises questions about how the notion ought to be understood.
The Sanctification Argument
A number of scholars have recently argued that the notion of purgatory 
should be taken seriously by all Christians, including Protestants, who 
have typically followed the Reformers in dismissing the notion as an 
extra-biblical teaching. Jerry Walls, in his recent book, Heaven: The Logic 
o f Eternal Joy,1 has argued that the doctrine of purgatory is plausible for 
Christians of all stripes, and that it is a natural development of the doc­
trine of salvation.
This paper will address a similar argument developed independently 
by Justin Barnard. I share Barnard's conviction that the case for purgatory 
is worthy of exploration by Protestant Christians. However the argument 
he offers, which I will call the 'sanctification argument for purgatory,' has 
an interesting flaw—not a fatal flaw, but one that complicates the case for 
purgatory in a way that illuminates the range of viable options.
First let's look at the argument, which has a two-part structure. The first 
part is what Barnard calls the 'dilemma of sanctification.'2 The saved, those 
who have saving faith, are divided into two disjoint groups: the sanctified, 
those of the saved whose settled state of character renders them incapable 
of committing sinful acts,3 and the lapsable, those who lack such a settled 
state of character. Heaven, the argument continues, is essentially morally 
perfect. It is not possible (nomologically,4 at the least) that anyone in heav­
en sin. This is no problem for the sanctified, but what about the lapsable? 
Since they are capable of sin, they must be excluded from heaven, even 
though they are among the saved.
It appears, then, that either saving faith does not guarantee the heav­
enly state after death, or else heaven is not essentially morally perfect. 
This puzzle is the dilemma of sanctification.
The second part of the sanctification argument considers two prospec­
tive solutions to the dilemma: purgatory and provisionism.5 Purgatory
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solves the puzzle by saying that through a process of spiritual purging 
the lapsable can and will become members of the sanctified in the next 
life, at which point they will enter heaven. Provisionism is the thesis that 
God makes "unilateral provisions" for the complete sanctification of the 
lapsable, so that they become members of the sanctified at death or im­
mediately afterward.
The argument proceeds by process of diminution. A difficulty with pro- 
visionism is that there are reasons to doubt that instantaneous sanctifica­
tion is something God would bring about, if indeed it is possible. If God 
is willing and able to provide complete sanctification to the saved imme­
diately after death, it is hard to see why God would not provide complete 
sanctification to the saved before death. One reason, perhaps, is that it is 
significantly better for free and fallen creatures to have a hand in their 
own moral progress. This reason, however, supports the idea that such 
creatures have a hand in their moral progress after death as well; in other 
words, it supports purgatory over provisionism.6
This second part is the meat of the argument, and is the part likely to 
draw the most controversy. One might contend, for example, that the 
resemblance of the above argument against provisionism to some versions 
of the evidential argument from evil7 renders the former vulnerable to re­
cent criticisms of the latter. The considerations that call into question the 
assumption that we would be able to see God's good reasons for permit­
ting evil if there were such reasons (e.g., the limitations of our expertise 
and the complexity of wise governance of human history) arguably under­
mine the assumption that we would be able to see God's good reasons for 
not completing the sanctification of the lapsable immediately after death if 
there were such reasons. Barnard devotes much of his article to defense of 
this stage of the argument.
However there is a modal flaw in the first part of the argument, the part 
that concludes it is impossible for the lapsable to be in heaven, and it is this 
part that is of present interest. After noting the gap in the logic, I will show 
how one can take advantage of it to fashion an additional account of sancti­
fication in the afterlife, one which makes sanctification a heavenly process.
The Modal Flaw
Here's the modal flaw. The claim is that from the moral perfection of heav­
en and the definition of 'lapsable' it follows that the lapsable cannot be in 
heaven. As Barnard puts it, "... the essential moral perfection of heaven is 
such that it is not nomologically possible for sin or evil to be there. Since 
the Lapsable are persons for whom sinful or evil actions are a nomological 
possibility, no one in heaven is lapsable."8 The reasoning seems to be this:
It is not possible that anyone sin in heaven.
It is possible that the lapsable sin.
Therefore, none of the lapsable are in heaven.9
This conclusion challenges us to explain how the lapsable can become 
sanctified before entering heaven. (The notion of possibility Barnard uses 
is a causal or nomological possibility, but what follows will apply equally 
well to absolute possibility.)
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The argument above is invalid. Consider this parallel argument.
It is not possible that anyone stand while sitting.
It is possible for five-year-old children to stand.
Therefore, no five-year-old child is sitting.
Five-year-olds do sometimes sit. But both premises are true, so the argu­
ment is invalid. We can see the problem easily enough: although it is pos­
sible for five-year-olds to stand, they may fail to exercise that capacity 
without ceasing to be five-year-olds. In particular, they may sit, and in that 
way fail to exercise their capacity to stand.
The situation is similar in the case of the lapsable. They have the capac­
ity to sin, but they may fail to exercise that capacity without ceasing to be 
among the lapsable, that is, those whose character is not settled in a virtu­
ous state. It follows from the premises that it is not possible for any of the 
lapsable to sin in heaven, but it does not follow that the lapsable cannot be 
in heaven. What's left open is the possibility that some of the lapsable be 
in heaven but not sin for as long as they remain lapsable.
The Heavenly Sanctification Account
The upshot of this in the present context is that there is, at least in prin­
ciple, a solution to the dilemma of sanctification other than those Barnard 
considers. To explore this idea, let's construct a theological model that af­
firms the moral perfection of heaven and places some of the lapsable in 
heaven. I will call it 'the heavenly sanctification account.' The effect of the 
account, loosely put, will be to move the locus of heaven's necessary sin­
lessness from the stability of character its inhabitants enjoy to God's inten­
tions for that state.
Unlike purgatory and provisionism, the heavenly sanctification account 
says that those whose character does not yet preclude sin, the lapsable, 
may nonetheless enter heaven, there to be further sanctified until the pro­
cess is complete. A person like the "good thief" of the biblical crucifixion 
accounts, for example, enters heaven despite an imperfect character. How­
ever, God sees to it that he is not put in circumstances that result in his sin. 
With God's guidance, he exercises his freedom and plays a significant role 
in shaping his own character, as before death.
There are a number of ways we might develop this account to explain 
how God prevents each person in heaven from sinning. One route is to situ­
ate the account within a Molinist theory of divine providence, which in­
cludes both libertarian freedom and non-determining divine control over its 
exercise. Since on this view God knows by middle knowledge what any free 
creature would do if placed in given circumstances, God could know that a 
given person, though not perfectly virtuous, would not in fact sin in certain 
heavenly circumstances. A person prone to lie about her past, say, would 
be kept from the situations in which she would give in to this temptation. 
Instead, she would be placed in situations such that the free acts she would 
then perform helped to weaken and finally to eliminate her tendency to lie. 
A growing knowledge of divine grace for specific sins of her past might 
belong to the circumstances that enable her truthful behavior. The process 
could be either fast or slow, depending on the particulars of the case.
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An alternative way of developing the account has it that God's knowl­
edge of the saved person's dispositions and character (apart from any 
middle knowledge) enables God to place her in circumstances that do not 
lead to any sinful act. God would either steer her clear of any tempta­
tion to which her dispositions leave her vulnerable or provide an overrid­
ing grace to keep those dispositions from being active. Over time, in part 
because of the saved person's own actions, the problematic dispositions 
would dissolve. Here the locus of heaven's necessary sinlessness is again 
God's governance.
On both variations, heavenly sin will be nomologically impossible if 
God has sufficiently stable intentions to guide the lapsable clear of sinful 
actions. Given the regular intentions by which God governs the universe, 
the denizens of heaven will not sin. If, on the other hand, the very nature 
of God's faithfulness ensures that those God has redeemed and brought 
into heavenly communion with himself will remain in this communion, 
then heavenly sin will be absolutely impossible. Either way, the account 
includes the essential moral perfection of heaven, since, with a necessity 
grounded either in the divine will or in divine goodness, God in love pro­
tects each person in the heavenly state from sin.
There may be some question whether there are circumstances in which 
a lapsable person would continue to act without sin and which lead ulti­
mately to complete sanctification, but the burden here is on the objector. 
The circumstances of heaven, no doubt, provide vastly more influence for 
the good than the circumstances of this life. If heaven includes anything 
like a vision of God's nature or an unparalleled presence of his Spirit, we 
should expect even an imperfect human to be thoroughly motivated and 
equipped to amend her faults.
Barnard distinguishes between satisfaction models and sanctification 
models of purgatory.10 In satisfaction models, purgatory's function is to 
allow people to make payment for their sins. In sanctification models, 
purgatory's function is to allow people to participate in their continuing 
moral and spiritual development. As Barnard observes, one important 
advantage of a sanctification model is that it avoids the primary Protes­
tant objection to purgatory, viz., that payment for sin comes solely by the 
atoning work of Christ. It will be clear from the foregoing (if not from the 
name) that the heavenly sanctification account shares this feature of sanc­
tification models of purgatory.
Purgatorial Metaphors
The traditional teaching on the nature and function of purgatory has typi­
cally included the torment of those being purged of their sin and the vivid 
image of purifying flames.11 St. John Fisher's Exposition o f the Seven Peni­
tential Psalms12 provides one historical example of an explicit comparison 
between the pains of purgatory and hell. In his sermon on Psalm 6, Fisher 
writes, "Truly, so great is the acerbity of the pains in that place that there 
is no difference between the pains of hell and those of purgatory except 
eternity" (11). St. John Vianney later expressed a similar view with the 
language of fire.13
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The fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of Hell; the difference
between them is that the fire of Purgatory is not everlasting___Cruel
separation! To burn in the fire kindled by the justice of God! ... To be 
devoured by regret, knowing that we could so easily have avoided 
such sorrows!14
Barnard, in contrast, borrows from C. S. Lewis the less hellish images of a 
painful washing and of a biting dental rinse.
Like Barnard's model, the heavenly sanctification account is suited to 
rather different imagery than that of Fisher and Vianney. Because both tra­
ditional thinking and all other thinking about the afterlife has been deeply 
shaped by imaginative depictions, it will be worthwhile to reflect on how 
the imagination may engage the heavenly sanctification account.
Consider, then, the description of the new Jerusalem15 at Revelation 
22:2. It includes the tree of life, "bearing twelve crops of fruit, yielding its 
fruit every month. And the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the na­
tions." The image suggests an ongoing healing process. If we construe this 
as a spiritual process, it would be natural to suppose that it involves im­
proving states of character—the melting away of the bitterness of a family 
dispute that's been passed down like an heirloom, the transformation of a 
plodding faith into an energetic love for God, and so on.
Consider also the imagery of Rev. 7:17 (the last clause of which is re­
peated at 21:4 and is reminiscent of Is. 25:8): "For the Lamb at the center 
of the throne will be their shepherd; he will lead them to springs of liv­
ing water. And God will wipe away every tear from their eyes." 'Their' 
and 'them' refer to the great multitude in white robes standing before the 
throne of God; the scene is in heaven. The actions of God and the Lamb 
may be associated with sanctification: the leading to springs of living wa­
ter is suggestive of the sanctifying Holy Spirit (cf. John 4:10, 13), and the 
wiping away of tears perhaps includes removal of the sorrow-producing 
effects of sin. (The Isaiah passage adds, "He will remove the disgrace of 
his people from all the earth.") Both of these are depicted as processes, 
even if brief ones. My suggestion is that there is powerful biblical imagery 
of healing in God's presence in heaven, and that this suits the heavenly 
sanctification account precisely.
Objection: The Pain of Regret
Naturally these images of heaven do not involve torment or separation 
from God. One might object, though, that another kind of pain is inevita­
ble if the heavenly sanctification account is true—not the pain of "knowing 
that we could so easily have avoided such sorrows" but of mourning one's 
past sins. On the face of it, all pain is ruled out: "There will be no more 
death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed 
away" (Rev. 21:4). If regret is unavoidable in coming to recognize the ex­
tent of one's sin, it seems it cannot be a recognition that occurs in heaven.
Let me suggest two possible replies. We might take this last passage as 
a strictly accurate characterization of heaven after its initial phase and a 
generally accurate characterization of heaven as a whole. What the book of 
Revelation gives us, after all, is a picture, not a list of individually necessary
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and jointly sufficient conditions. Perhaps at the outset the pain of regret, 
though present, is overwhelmed by the joy of grace and reconciliation.
Alternatively, we could make use of a distinction from City o f God. 
Augustine writes,
Thus, knowledge of evil is of two kinds: one in which it is accessible 
to apprehension by the mind, the other in which it is a matter of di­
rect experience. . . . There are two corresponding ways of forgetting 
evil. The learned scholar's way of forgetting is different from that of 
one who has experienced suffering. The scholar forgets by neglect­
ing his studies; the sufferer, by escaping from his misery. The saints 
will have no sensible recollection of past evils; theirs will be the sec­
ond kind of forgetfulness by which they will be set free from them 
all, and they will be completely erased from their feelings.16
Agreeing with Augustine, we might either say that regret is no part of 
the saints' recollection of sin, or else distinguish between two kinds of re­
gret, one of which involves pain, the other of which is simply a judgment 
about one's wrongdoing-pain having been supplanted by gratitude for 
the present healing of one's spirit.
Objection: Sinfulness and the Presence of God
It is evident that the heavenly sanctification account does not enjoy the tra­
ditional status of either the purgatorial or the provisionist view. One pos­
sible motivating reason suggested by Barnard's discussion is that nothing 
sinful can be in the dwelling place or presence of God. If to be in heaven is 
to be in God's presence, the imperfectly sanctified must be excluded.
What do we mean by 'presence' here? Barnard refers to heaven as a 
place only for the sake of convenience, but suppose we do think of pres­
ence as a spatial location. Then we will probably want to say that God's 
presence is all-inclusive, i.e., that God is omnipresent. (As David asks in 
Psalm 139, "Where can I flee from your presence?") Or we might prefer 
to be sophisticated and say that although God's power and knowledge 
extend to all places, God does not, properly speaking, have location at all, 
so that no place is God's presence. In any case, the simplistic picture of a 
special region (in the sky?) where God is located loses its appeal on very 
little reflection.
If it's not a spatial location we have in mind, then perhaps God's pres­
ence is to be thought of as a kind of spiritual communion, a relationship 
of love and delight. In this case presence is the sort of thing that comes in 
degrees. That's a bit awkward if we are thinking of heaven as God's pres­
ence, since we don't normally think of heaven as coming in degrees (even 
if some things come in degrees in heaven17). It's also in tension with the 
assumption that nothing sinful can be in God's presence, since even sinful 
humans can have a measure of communion with God. Indeed, we might 
see the doctrine of the Incarnation as the doctrine that God is present with 
sinners in a very strong sense.
These problems might be avoided by identifying heaven not with God's 
presence per se but with some particular kind or degree of communion
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with God. Such an identification would be consistent with a view that dif­
fered from the heavenly sanctification account only in name, one which 
allowed purgatory to take the role that heaven's initial segment does on 
the heavenly sanctification account. Purgatory could involve even experi­
ences of theophany, revelation, and shared community with the perfectly 
sanctified (i.e., with those in heaven) rather than separation from God and 
the sanctified. The difference between a view like this and the heavenly 
sanctification account is merely semantic.
Conclusion
The sanctification model of purgatory gets much of its appeal from the val­
ue of free self-direction of character. It is a gift to be able to play a nontrivi­
al role in one's own spiritual development. In granting this gift, God treats 
human beings with an adult dignity. The problem of evil may give theists 
a reason to affirm the value of the exercise of freedom; if so, the sanctifica­
tion model of purgatory receives some support from that debate.
This is relevant in assessing the heavenly sanctification account. Both 
the sanctification model of purgatory and the heavenly sanctification ac­
count involve free postmortem action that contributes to the agent's moral 
development. To the extent that the value of the free self-direction of one's 
character supports the case for purgatory, it also supports the heavenly 
sanctification account. In fact, the latter also has three other virtues Bar­
nard claims for the sanctification model: it solves the dilemma of sanctifi­
cation, preserves the integrity of the process of sanctification, and avoids 
undermining the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin.
Further, the heavenly sanctification account has advantages over pur­
gatory. It quite naturally fits the biblical picture in which heaven and hell 
are the only salient afterlife destinations, and it avoids the suggestion that 
God is not present to the departed (cf. Paul's desire to be with Christ in 
Phil. 1:23-24).
So on the criteria Barnard identifies, the heavenly sanctification account 
is a serious competitor with the purgatorial view. No doubt still other ac­
counts of postmortem sanctification could be developed. A hybrid of pro- 
visionism and the heavenly sanctification account, for example, would al­
low a partial, miraculous gift of sanctifying grace at death, followed by a 
completing process of sanctification in heaven. The point, in any case, is 
that there are other solutions to Barnard's dilemma of sanctification than 
two he considers, and so the sanctification argument for purgatory as a 
whole is somewhat more complex than it might at first appear.
On the other hand, as noted, versions of the sanctification model of pur­
gatory and the heavenly sanctification account are similar enough that the 
distinction between heaven and purgatory can become a bit blurred.18 The 
way in which 'heaven' and 'purgatory' are defined naturally makes a big 
difference to whether the heavenly sanctification account will be classified 
as above, or as an unusually sunny picture of purgatory.
Whatever we may call it, the heavenly sanctification account preserves 
the free spiritual development of purgatory, but replaces the purifying 
flame with the medicinal leaves of the tree of life, which are "for the heal­
ing of the nations." The account is, I suggest, a viable alternative to a pur­
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gatorial view, and one which shares its chief advantages. At this stage of 
the dialogue, there remain several competing responses to the dilemma of 
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